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Wholly local? Ownership as philosophy and practice in peacebuilding interventions 
Vesna Bojicic- Dzelilovic and Mary Martin 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper engages with the theme of local ownership in peacebuilding from a practice- 
based perspective which suggests that the way in which the external actors reach out and 
work with local constituencies shows conceptual and practice gaps that limit the applicability 
of local ownership in day-to-day peacebuilding operations. We examine how, in the case of 
EU peacebuilding policies, such gaps impair the potential for effective, inclusive and 
sustainable peacebuilding. Using a Whole- of-Society lens the paper demonstrates how 
current modalities of EU engagement fail to embrace the diversity of local society and its 
authentic forms of mobilisation and action in order to pursue peacebuilding objectives that 
resonate with locally relevant forms of peace. The paper further reflects on how Whole-of-
Society perspective can provides pointers for enhancing peacebuilding practices in this area. 
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Introduction 
 
The norm of local ownership of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction goes to the 
heart of the moral and practical dilemmas of external interventions in civil conflict. The 
translation  from policy ideal to good practice has been observed as a challenge dogged by 
conceptual confusion and process issues, that continues to intrigue scholarship and defy 
effective implementation. While an emphasis on local agency and empowerment is seen as a 
critical, and often elusive  factor in ensuring effective and sustainable peacebuilding by major 
actors such as the  UN and the EU, and has featured strongly in reviews of practice  (most 
recently the UN peacekeeping reviews and the EU global strategy), changes are being 
pursued predominantly at the strategic level whereas tactical and operational  difficulties  in 
implementing local ownership persist.
1
 
In this paper we start from the assumption that the practice, or problem-solving 
perspective of local ownership represents the most significant deficit which undermines the 
normative premise of local ownership that it serves to improve the legitimacy of intervention, 
ensure the  increased involvement and support of local populations,  and from this enhance 
durable outcomes from international peacebuilding  policies. Following the observation that 
practice also lags scholarship on this issue
2
, this paper attempts to reflect  the practice 
implications of the scholarly debate which has problematised  the gap between rhetorical 
commitment and results on the ground, by showing  local engagement as  essentially a  
strategy  of compliance with externally promoted policy blueprints, and secondly as failure to 
understand ‘ the local’. We seek to build on these conceptualisations to suggest that the 
practice deficit not only needs to address both these elements, but also tailor implementation 
more closely to  the variegated and dynamic nature of local society at the non-state level, 
seeing these as creative possibilities  and capabilities of  external peacebuilding and not  a 
limitation and block on its progress. We propose that a thicker
3
 form of engagement with 
local society  based on alignments between external policies on the one hand,  and non-state 
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actors, networked relationships  and sub-national processes  on the other, could address the 
lag  between scholarship and practice.  
This is the proposition of a Whole-of-Society (WOS) approach. In the case of local 
ownership, WOS extrapolates from scholarship to capture local agency and capabilities that 
shape the dynamics of peacebuilding processes and their outcomes.  A Whole-of-Society 
approach would seek to build  ‘the social capital of intervention’4 by externals, focusing on 
leveraging  the presence of a  diversity of local groups, and their  networked and agential 
character in dense social  contexts of conflict spaces.  In peacebuilding terms, social capital  
emanates within group interactions and co-operation initiatives and in the engagements  
between  external and local constituencies, for example where the EU or other entities fund, 
enable and empower local actors, providing  the ‘glue which facilitates, co-operation 
exchange and innovation ‘ while also accounting for the tensions and contradictions such 
interactions may entail. 
5
 
 
Empirically, we show how local actors mobilise to respond to multiple vulnerabilities 
they experience and decide on priorities, as well as their flexibility and ability to tap into 
diverse local capacities.  Within a framework of Whole-of-Society, we also show how local 
mobilisations respond to opportunities and constraints that international involvement creates. 
The aim is to suggest new avenues for external engagement which are grounded in both actor 
and process dynamics within local society. We have grouped these avenues of engagement in 
terms of (actor) inclusivity, leveraging local relationships and synchronizing with practices of 
local peacebuilding. We suggest that these forms and avenues of engagement constitute latent 
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possibilities of current peacebuilding practice, which can complement and enrich the 
international-local interaction.  
The paper aims to contribute to debates on local ownership by providing a practice-
based perspective and by adding to the pool of empirical evidence on the implementation of 
local ownership at operational level. The analysis draws primarily from empirical data 
collected during field work in Ukraine in September 2016, which involved a roundtable 
discussion with local and international practitioners, policy-makers, academic experts and 
civil society activists, 11 individual semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the 
business sector, faith groups, civil society, informal groups providing humanitarian aid to 
occupied territories, think tanks and academic experts in Kiev, and one focus group with civil 
society organisations. This data is combined with empirical observations from other cases of 
international interventions in peacebuilding and conflict resolution collected as part of the 
research project on EU Civilian Capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding and 
through desk studies. 
 
Local ownership: Conceptual- practical contention and the value- added of a Whole-of-
Society approach 
A recurrent theme among scholars of peacebuilding and development during the last 25 
years, local ownership has gone through several iterations of conceptual development whose 
consequences for peacebuilding practice have been ambivalent at best. In the mid-1990s, the 
main preoccupation was with a problem of noncompliance with externally supported 
programmes and policies among the intended beneficiaries of peacebuilding efforts. A lack of 
take-up and affiliation was attributed to a combination of local resistance to externally 
prescribed programmes and the fact that policies had limited relevance to realities on the 
ground,  as well as to absent capacities on the recipient side.
6
 Questions were raised about 
how to fix the gaps between the rhetoric and practice of local ownership, and in particular 
what was needed to bring about greater engagement of the beneficiaries of international 
interventions.
7
  
Scholarly attempts to address the latter by injecting more clarity and practical utility 
into the concept of local ownership by pairing it with a range of synonyms, namely 
participation, inclusion, consultation, dialogue, self-reliance, responsibility, and 
accountability, turned ultimately into an exercise akin to unpacking a Russian doll. Since 
some of those concepts, notably inclusion and participation which became themselves new 
norms in peacebuilding, proved no less difficult to operationalize.
8
  On the interveners’ side 
the implementation of local ownership with such variable meanings was challenged by a 
myriad of practical and process issues. These included the difficulties of coordination in a 
multi-actor peacebuilding context, the prevailing organisational silo mentality, poor 
operational guidelines, international actors’ pragmatic, short-term stabilisation outlook with a 
focus on discrete (preferably quantifiable) outputs, a lack of sustained effort, and more 
generally the tensions created by approaching essentially political issues in a technocratic 
manner. For example, a commitment to more participation clashed with a pressure for more 
control, stricter reporting and donor accountability that practitioners faced.
9
 But all together 
those practical and process issues were confounded by a lack of conceptual clarity regarding 
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the local of peacebuilding interventions and the meaningful content of the peacebuilding 
exercise ingrained in the notion of local ownership. The UN and the EU for instance 
approached local ownership as primarily about engaging with national government elites in 
contrast to international non- governmental organisations’ focus on the societal grass root 
level and its actors.  As to the substance of peacebuilding, it reflected the interveners’ liberal 
peace variant of market, democracy and good governance as a way to resolve the conflict and 
sustain peace.
10
 Various interpretations of local ownership aside
11
, ‘implementing’ it on the 
ground was characterised by partial, superficial, often shallow, and ad hoc engagement with a 
predefined set of local actors.
12
 The foremost concern on the interveners’ side was how to 
overcome resistance, and ensure local buy- in for their enterprise by engaging the ‘right’ local 
constituencies rather than taking issue directly and systematically with the latter’s concerns.13  
This phase of local ownership scholarship was criticised for its focus on external 
interveners
14
, and as deficient in its account of ‘the local’ component of peacebuilding, and 
by extension local ownership. The charge was that inadequate conceptualisation of the local 
resulted in a lack of ontological relevance of local ownership in practice and intractable 
problems in translating the conceptualisation of the local into programming concepts.
15
 The 
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ensuing scholarship of the so called ‘local turn’ reconceptualised the local to capture its 
plural, fluid, dynamic and agential quality- in other words to identify the ‘true’ local- and 
proposed to put the local as everyday practice at the centre of peacebuilding practice.
16
  
Instead of relying on pre-defined prescriptive frameworks and the local as given, from this 
perspective external interveners and scholars are invited to engage contextually with the local 
forms of agency and their unexpected capacities.
17
 The most notable practice response was a 
change in the approach to inclusion that extended outreach to ‘atypical’ local interlocutors 
including prominently women and youth as well as other traditionally marginalised 
categories, notably internally displaced population and minority groups. Another practice 
change was more systematic engagement of civil society organisations in preparations and 
evaluations of strategic documents evident in the UN, the EU and other major actors engaged 
in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. This still myopic interpretation of inclusivity in 
practice echoed a criticism some scholars expressed that the local turn perspective engaged 
insufficiently with local agency, and that this in turn generated another set of practice 
problems.
18
 As a result, peacebuilding practice continued to be poorly equipped to deliver on 
the normative promise of local ownership.
19
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The source of this enduring difficulty to operationalise local ownership is ultimately a 
cognitive one. While the first phase of local ownership scholarship highlighted the problems 
of insufficient agency, local turn scholars go further in viewing agency as not only a premise 
of locally owned peacebuilding but also a challenge to the international community’s liberal 
peace project. Both phases see local agency in terms of resistance, but on different grounds. 
In the early local ownership debates, resistance was about a misfit between the external and 
local understanding of peace; in the more recent accounts, the emphasis is on ‘resistant 
agency’20 whereby resistance is imbued with emancipatory potential. This assumption of 
local agency as either a deficit or a problem to overcome,
21
 has been tackled by a more recent 
process-centred, relational perspective on peacebuilding and local ownership, which 
foregrounds interactions, processes and practices in the local peacebuilding context.
22
 Of 
particular note is the emphasis on pragmatism which ‘directs attention to the everyday 
practices, strategies and institutions as a basis for addressing concrete problems at hand’23 
and the importance of ‘how practices work in a particular context’.24 In contrast to the rather 
abstract tenor of much of the scholarship on local ownership, a focus on relations and 
processes is seen as way to ‘reach out into the everyday and pragmatically support local 
practices in addressing context specific challenges’.25  
The notion of Whole-of-Society (WOS) offers one way of approaching the existing 
practices and processes of peacebuilding as a starting point to arrive at more constructive, 
peace inducing relationships among the plethora of actors and agencies in the conflict space. 
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It is a pragmatic and positivist- in a sense of objective and fact based- take on local agency as 
enacted through interactions of actors and process in a conflict space.  A Whole-of-Society 
approach suggests that intervention practice can acknowledge and reflect local responses to 
conflicts not only by attempting to engage with a greater diversity of local stakeholders, but 
also through identifying  combinations of significant non-state actors , taking account of 
relationships  and interactions among local groups, and by recognising the breadth, depth and 
relevance of indigenous practices. This is to think about not only who constitutes local 
society, but also how social actors exercise agency both individually, in conjunction with 
other locals and with internationals.  Going further, the explicitly normative aspect of a 
Whole-of-Society approach sees the presence of external intervention itself as a creative site 
of local conflict responses, providing additional dynamism and also glue for interactions at 
the grass roots, capturing elements of pragmatic engagement which are currently obscured. 
The shift in practice implied is to move away from a problematic view of local ownership  
and the local as something to be overcome and transformed, to recognising  the resources 
inherent in how local actors respond to multiple security needs. It is also about crafting a 
capability out of recognising and building on the  strategies they use to respond to the 
interconnected nature of vulnerabilities in the conflict space. Working with all these elements 
of inclusivity, the importance of relationships and the relevance of local practice responses to 
conflict, WOS seeks to shift policy mechanisms away from a dominant  focus on  elite 
bargains, programmatic interventions or capacity and institution building  towards supporting 
and leveraging  patterns of actorness and organisation in a local space. 
 
Figure 1 Whole-of-Society perspective on local ownership 
 
In the following sections we examine  examples of local ownership in peacebuilding  
practice applying  Whole-of-Society as a prism which  highlights three aspects: how 
inclusivity is pursued (both in terms of actors and processes); what kinds of relations are 
mobilised; and what kinds of practices and processes local actors engage in to deal with 
multiple vulnerabilities of the conflict-affected population. We identify two particular social 
groups, namely private sector and faith groups which merit investigation as neglected sites of 
local agency and  provide lens for tracing different aspects of  local ownership in practice. 
 
Inclusivity 
 
A tendency in external peacebuilding to focus on and privilege a relatively narrow group of 
locals, which can be characterised as government and non-government elites, is also 
characteristic of EU practices. There are many reasons for this, to do with process and 
conceptual issues that can lead to marginalisation of constituencies which may be integral to 
constructing a representative picture of local society and sites of agency, and that are relevant 
in terms of building social capital of intervention. Sometimes, important constituencies are 
invisible and bypassed because, as Mac Ginty suggests, the internationals are simply not 
equipped to see the local;
26
 or because of physical and conflict geography of the locality; or 
because of the rules and regulations international actors follow in engaging with local 
constituencies such as funding priorities and procedures which delimit target beneficiaries to 
those who are able to apply for and implement external donor programmes; or excluding 
certain actors on ethical grounds.   
We identified two types of groups in particular, namely private companies and faith 
groups which are under-acknowledged by external interventions. Yet they are significant in 
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terms of representing an important aspect of agency in the conflict space, either through their 
own identities and efforts within local society and /or their abilities to mobilise other social 
groups. Their marginalisation (while not being acknowledged within a category of 
‘marginalised’ actors as typically understood in the mainstream peacebuilding theory and 
practice)  illustrates persistent gaps in peacebuilding practice that operates on an implicit 
rationale of ‘sufficient and inclusive enough’27 engagement with local actors. This limited 
horizon of vision
28
 undermines the effectiveness of intervention, and stymies more substantial 
and dynamic forms of interaction between locals and internationals. In this sense, our focus 
on these two particular groups is illustrative of the gaps and missed opportunities for external 
peacebuilders to engage both vertically and horizontally with local society.  
 
The private sector 
The private sector is on the whole disconnected from mainstream peacebuilding interventions 
and its contribution is conceived as an indirect one through its role as a driver of economic 
growth and a provider of jobs. The private sector is however uniquely embedded in local 
society, with links across multiple societal levels that can be harnessed for peacebuilding 
goals or  equally whose tendency to pursue particularistic interests needs to be addressed to 
prevent them undermining peace.
29
 Companies are often primary providers of security in 
contexts where there is an absence of government or international governance. Examples of 
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this include Yemen where the only international representatives on the ground after the Arab 
Spring were the security officials from oil companies; or in Ukraine where companies have 
continued operating in the territories controlled by separatists from which government and 
many civil society actors have withdrawn. 
30
  
Highlighting the multiple identities of the private sector which are shaped by the 
locally contingent social processes of conflict and deep social transformation unfolding in 
Ukraine, are new forms of private sector activism geared towards governance reforms and 
broader socio-economic development objectives. The conflict that at the level of official 
politics and diplomacy is couched in terms of separatist movements and Russian occupation, 
is internally also about transforming the economic and political model based on the rule of 
powerful oligarchs. Businessmen were among the leading figures of the Maidan 
‘revolution’31 that predated the conflict; hence possessing a dual identity as both commercial 
and social/political actors embedded in dense social networks. The European Business 
Association Ukraine
32
 has taken up to  improve governance standards and to counter 
corruption, as part of a broad agenda of national renewal outlined in the New Vision 
Statement, which emerged in response to the Maidan citizens’ mobilisation. Formally 
separated into two opposing political camps-  one under the formal jurisdiction of the Ukraine 
government, the other belonging to the separatist government- business on both sides of the 
divide, share a concern over rising criminality which is a consequence of  disruption to the 
legal economy. Rising criminality which deforms Ukraine’s economic and social fabric as 
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well as compounds everyday insecurity is a problem with potential for long lasting 
consequences on governance and economic development. However its pernicious impact on 
the everyday life of Ukraine’s communities has been largely ignored by the political elites 
and its international interlocutors focused on finding political solution to the conflict.
33
 At the 
same time  the private sector’s awareness of and responsiveness to the immediate needs of 
the conflict-affected population in Ukraine are manifested in their proactive role in securing 
employment for internally displaced people with women and older workers as priority 
categories by using a government tax facilitation scheme .
34
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 Faith groups 
Among scholars and peacebuilding practitioners religion tends to be framed 
predominantly in terms of a conflict driver, rather than treating religious groups as a category  
of socio-political actor with peacebuilding potential. 
35
 Their comparative advantage 
associated with long term presence and commitment, and their spiritual and moral authority, 
often combined with economic resources, are insufficiently acknowledged in peacebuilding 
practice. Experience  of peacebuilding shows many examples where faith groups have 
assumed a public profile in formal (and informal) processes of multi-track diplomacy and 
somewhat less so in other policy areas such as SSR and governance reform.  The civil 
authority of faith groups has been successfully leveraged in processes of reconciliation, 
access to justice and conflict mediation as illustrated by the role of the local religious groups 
in Mozambique, Sudan and Uganda.
36
  
In Ukraine and Georgia the involvement of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Orthodox 
Church in political debates and the behaviour of church officials in disputed territories has 
contributed to defining the external analysis of those conflicts, whereas the church’s ongoing 
everyday responses to the conflicts are also interesting in revealing its role in peacebuilding 
and conflict prevention.
37
 In Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church is an influential socio-
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economic actor with an economic portfolio in agriculture, tourism, and construction as well 
as a provider of education; it also has a stake in over 400 print and electronic media which 
affords it multiple channels of influence in local society.
38
 
 
As well as an ambiguous political actor, at another level of action the Russian 
Orthodox Church has supported the work of volunteer brigades consisting of churchgoers and 
civil society organisations in providing humanitarian assistance in Eastern Ukraine and 
psychosocial care for internally displaced people. The brigades also provide practical advice 
on relocation, employment opportunities and other needs of displaced population. ‘Save 
Ukraine’ is a fusion of religious and secular groups that operate a brigade style system in 
providing humanitarian aid in 24 locations across the borderline between government and 
separatist territories; they also provide moral and spiritual support to internally displaced and 
former fighters; it also runs a hot line for any citizens needing advice and help .
39
  
From a Whole-of-Society perspective, besides reaching out to ‘hidden’ and 
overlooked actors, the process of inclusion itself is consequential in ensuring more locally 
relevant peacebuilding by supporting existing capabilities and resources. Gaining ground in 
the development aid community, and much less so among peacebuilding practitioners despite 
theoretical advances pointing in that direction, is an approach of ‘locally- led’ initiatives 
intended to tap into latent local capabilities.
40
 By way of illustration, in Kenya the Danish 
government development agency supported a combination of religious- based and 
development organisations, some of which were informal groups of volunteers, to work on 
conflict resolution and terrorism prevention so that they were able to define the priorities and 
main lines of actions. Such an approach enables those organisations to engage with a range of 
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actors including armed youth, religious preachers and terror suspects whose participation in 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding is fundamentally important and yet sidelined in official 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention practices of the EU and most key international 
players.
41
 Here the different qualities of faith- groups, in particular their moral and spiritual 
authority in some contexts, that allow them to mobilise for peace often the most unlikely of 
social groups, are important and yet underutilised   aspect of local agency.  
     
A relational perspective  
 
For peacebuilding practice, one of the most pertinent issues around local ownership is 
identifying ‘the right’ interlocutors within a host society who could take on board 
peacebuilding, and preventing the ‘wrong’ type of actors from being empowered.42 Such   a 
simplistic understanding downplays the local complexities associated with a plurality of 
actors, actors’ multiple identities and the dynamic aspects of agency due to continuously 
changing interests, motives and priorities of those actors. In reality aggregated groupings 
such as confessional associations, and even more, the private sector, are diverse in nature and 
harbour different agendas. This diversity within ‘black boxes’ of corporate actors, implies 
opportunities for multiplier effects, as individual organisations’ agendas coincide and cross 
other interests in society, including other companies, and alternative religious affiliations. 
Both the potential and the pitfalls of such diversity can be neglected by a tunnel view towards   
local actors which overlooks their composite identity and dynamic relationships among 
different actor groups. 
A different approach has been tried in Colombia, where peacebuilders attempted to 
capture the versatile role of the private sector at the sub-national level through the Peace 
Laboratories project which encouraged various forms of partnering with other social actors, 
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namely local government officials, civil society and the church in a grass-root initiative that 
addressed multidimensional insecurities in Colombian regions. The Colombian government 
has historically had an uneven territorial presence and such grass root initiatives that mobilise 
local capacities throughout society are of vital importance for the prospect of so –called 
‘territorial peace’. Such ‘partnerships’  challenge the idea of the unitary state which informs 
the approach to local ownership in peacebuilding practice in favour of working with different 
components of Colombian society and their indigenous forms and drawing on synergy 
between secular and religious peacebuilding processes. 
In Ukraine, the ability of the European Business Association to draw on support from 
diaspora, is an example of how a diverse geography of peacebuilding and diverse 
relationships are being mobilised and deployed to create new sites of activism and authority. 
In responding to conflict developments on the ground, the Association has expanded its 
international contacts and collaboration  in order to strengthen its standing with the 
government and establish its credibility as a peacebuilding actor. The Association has taken 
advantage of the EU presence to secure  EU  backing  to increase its own international 
profile. This emboldened status is seen  as a step towards the Association eventually getting a 
seat at the table  to formally participate in the dialogue with the government over the future 
peace settlement.
43
 Simultaneously, at a different level of interaction, companies in Ukraine, 
some of which are the members of the Association- particularly in Kiev which has a large 
internally displaced population- have been actively involved in tri- partite relations with the 
government, civil society organisations and volunteer groups in supporting aforementioned 
work placement schemes for the internally displaced population.
44
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As regards faith groups, the comparative advantage of religious leaders has been 
noted in conducting conflict mediation by working in concert with a range of other 
stakeholders constituting a form of relational asset which offers the chance to advance more 
integrative peacebuilding. Excluding faith groups from internationally sponsored dialogues, 
for example because of a locally declared government commitment to secularism, can have 
detrimental effects on the relationships among different groups in societies where spiritual 
and confessional orientations within the local population are significant.
45
 One example of 
this kind of tension between the secular framing of international intervention and local 
practices are Somalia and Nigeria where the role of religious groups in peacebuilding over 
the secular channels has been particularly pronounced.
46
 In Ukraine, the Orthodox-dominated 
Ukrainian Council of Churches is an established interlocutor of government but other faith 
groups including Catholic, Jewish, Muslim and Buddhist are denied representation in the 
Council.
47
 As a result, the members of Ukraine’s Army of Islamic faith are not provided with 
spiritual assistance, which closes a potentially creative channel of representation and 
communication while creating further grounds for social tensions.
48
  
 
The significance of diverse groups being able to forge diverse types of relationships is 
illustrated by the aforementioned example of volunteer brigades in Ukraine, which originated 
in an initiative started by a cohort of churchgoers-initially only three-
49
  who were able to 
leverage their personal relations on both sides of Ukraine’s conflict to organise and work 
collaboratively to assist local population according to their own assessment of needs and 
priorities. In this particular example, a potential for building diverse and multilevel 
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relationships reflects the ability of faith groups to mobilise for peace beyond their own 
communities, and to work both in concert with as well as in parallel to other faith and secular 
groups, locally and transnationally, that remains insufficiently integrated with other  
peacebuilding efforts. 
 
Complementary practices 
  
Plural constituencies in the conflict space reflect not only different geographies and 
experiences but imply a diversity of attitudes to the conflict, different expectations regarding 
outcomes and anticipated results of external intervention. As a result, there are multiple 
opportunities for conflict responses, and a range of peacebuilding activities both independent 
of and in conjunction with external actors which reflect local understanding of problems and 
community needs.   
The issue of sequencing of civilian peacebuilding has been identified as a key policy 
and practice challenge to local ownership. 
50
 Locally organised groups of  activists, whatever 
their motivation (for example religious or business), are particularly effective in providing   
bridging activities  between humanitarian assistance at the sharp end of active conflict and 
underlying reforms to embed peace as well as between medium and longer-term assistance. 
The ability of small local actors to implement transitional activities is illustrated by the case 
of ‘Save Ukraine’ group. Mobilised initially around  humanitarian and emergency assistance, 
the group has established its credibility through  access to constituencies with extreme human 
security needs through timely and local intervention. Subsequent activities and services were 
adapted through a proximate knowledge  of next steps required which included for example 
livelihood strategies for the conflict-affected population that led to ‘Save Ukraine’ 
developing a programme to assist individuals with setting up bakery businesses .
51
  This is an 
example of pragmatic sequencing  of interventions, which  illustrates how coordination of 
different actors and activities takes place on the ground as the peacebuilding process unfolds 
in contrast to pre-existing protocols and frameworks drawn by the interveners.
52
 Furthermore, 
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this example illustrates how such small, local indigenous forms of engagement and practices 
are able to respond to a range of problems from  food insecurity, lack of livelihoods, lack of 
dignity, and governance issues. In contrast, the interconnected nature of such multiple 
vulnerabilities facing conflict-affected populations is poorly addressed by operational 
practices characterised by silo mentality among different peacebuilding organisations along 
with poor adaptive 
53
 and coordination capabilities. A similar  example of complementary 
local practices that approach peacebuilding and conflict resolution holistically is that of  the 
Centre for Resolution of Conflicts (CRC) in DRC which works on reintegration of 
demobilised soldiers, by relying on a large pool of volunteers who work  across different 
policy areas and with different community groups to ensure peaceful reintegration and 
support social cohesion. This approach contrasts with  fragmented process of reintegration in 
the context of institutionally- focused DDR reforms.
54
  
The fluid and highly connective nature of local activism not only shapes the universe 
of  local counterparties, including the emergence of ‘new’ actors. It also has a bearing on the 
type of practices in the conflict space and different combinations of actors involved. In 
Ukraine, the volunteer phenomenon is not only present among religious groups, but stems 
from civic engagement  with  the 2014 Maidan Euro-revolution, based on common feelings 
of national identity across multiple social groups. Technology and social media have 
provided the means of permanent and ongoing connections between different groups, and 
increased the level of mobilisation within local society. This has facilitated the formation of 
ad hoc groupings and alliances of local actors, which shift according to circumstance and 
whose objectives are a complex mix of addressing the impact of conflict while working 
towards societal transformation. They have become a feature of the conflict landscape, 
responding in immediate ways, with not only quick response times but a high degree of 
adaptability which is  an essential aspect from a  local ownership perspective. The funding 
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and strategic  priorities of these groups tend to have a short life-cycle, and this  limits their 
possibilities to secure financial backing from large donors which cater to more established 
civil society organisations with capacity to administer large grants over longer period of time. 
Yet these groups are better able to adapt to the rapid evolution of events on the ground and 
changing priorities, and develop small and short-term but nevertheless often vital  projects 
which target specific groups; for example older women , disabled former combatants or those 
traumatised by conflict and requiring psychological as well as practical help to re-enter the 
workforce. Local groups, such as the ‘Save Ukraine’ volunteers, are also more present in 
small towns and villages than international organisations typically  focused on larger 
population centres, leading to a  variable geography related to issues such as social justice, 
human rights and economic opportunities.  
The issue of funding local counterparties in peacebuilding is often at the forefront of 
the scholarly debates and practical concerns including a risk of propping up the ‘wrong 
local’. And yet in Ukraine, because of the specific context in which many types of civil 
organisations have emerged inspired by a national rejuvenation agenda, there are examples of 
local civil society organisations that have declined financial support from big donors, the EU 
included. The employment center for internally displaced people in Kiev, established by a 
group of Maidan activists, as a Facebook page, and with initial financial support from the EU, 
took a view that the EU programme limited to Eastern Ukraine was not appropriate and that 
supporting internally displaced people throughout the country better reflected local priorities 
which led it to  turne down the EU funding.
55
 Instead, the centre asked the EU officials to 
publicly endorse its work which gives it more leverage in pressuring the government to 
participate in some of the center’s initiatives. The center also took advantage of  the USAID 
assistance in the form of free office space which it shares  with three other indigenous 
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organisations working on different areas of peacebuilding. Sharing premises has been 
conducive to collaboration among the four groups of activists in designing programs that are 
more effective in responding to the impact of conflict and resulted in new  opportunities for 
joint fundraising. Thus  here the question is less about  local ownership  of international 
initiatives and more about how effectively external policies grasp dynamics on the ground,  
recognising diverse modalities of interactions among the international and local actors. This 
includes the fact that  internationals are able to play both a direct ( funding) and indirect role 
(in this case political support which improves the finance-raising abilities of local actors) in 
encouraging the diversity of local conflict responses that can be mutually beneficial. 
Unofficial and ad hoc coalitions between different groups create entry points for 
external actors to penetrate remote locations and areas where access is difficult and 
communications fluctuate, either as a result of ‘hot’ conflict or because of cultural barriers 
around marginalised groups, and in this way these entry points serve to complement activities 
that tend to be biased towards urban centres.  In contemporary conflicts, where active conflict 
is confined to particular parts of the country, while the capital may be relatively stable, the 
physical and affective distance between external practitioners, with few field offices or 
outposts  and nuclei of conflict, constitutes a gap in the possibility for more encompassing 
and mutually beneficial   peacebuilding interactions. This makes activists an important and 
topical sounding board for international peacebuilders to test both the extent and depth of 
needs, achieve real time, bottom-up analysis of the conflict and its impacts, and to develop 
appropriate responses. Religious groups in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, which suffer 
persistent human rights harassment by the local Russian-backed authorities, have for example 
served  as early warning posts for international peacebuilders of confrontation  and for 
particular sites of social tension.     
 
   Particularly in cases where there are huge movements of population – such as in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Yemen as a result of the conflict, the challenges of engaging with 
rapidly changing demographics as well as being adaptable to a shifting reality on the ground 
is an important aspect of local ownership in practice, which determines the effectiveness of 
traditional interventions by the EU and other actors. For example the task of holding elections 
in eastern Ukraine is hampered by the organisational problem of 70,000 unregistered voters  
and over 100,000 registered voters who in September 2016 when this research was conducted 
were  on the Russian side of the border.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Rather than viewing local ownership in instrumental terms by one side to bring about  greater 
engagement with and by  local actors, we have sought to analyse local ownership as part of a 
capability to leverage   positive social attributes of external-local ( including local-local) 
relations in a context of conflict and post-conflict. Where existing practices of local 
ownership enact an imprecise combination of process and goal orientated strategies, this 
perspective led us to investigate the social relationships and connections within interventions 
as well as  indigenous capacities for action in addition to simply focusing on which groups 
are  engaged by externals, and the modes for encouraging their involvement.  From this 
starting point, a Whole-of-Society approach offers an analytical view of local ownership, not 
as an instrumental  process of  mitigating negative perceptions of intervention, or reifying the 
local, or  for that matter another version of a bottom- up peacebuilding. Foremost,  it sees 
local ownership in terms of  developing a new capacity. The combination of horizontal and 
vertical axes introduced in the introduction to this collection of papers to capture multilevel, 
multiactor dynamics (vertical axis) and processes and practices across different fields of 
peacebuilding action (horizontal axis) offers an operational perspective based on leveraging 
the density and complexity of  conflict responses. This includes those responses which are 
generated at sub-national levels often in informal ways and in geographies traditionally 
unmarked by conventional peacebuilding through multilevel processes of interactions 
characterising  conflict space. As such, WOS perspective on local ownership  addresses two 
criticisms of the local ownership in peacebuilding which concern the identification of the 
local and the local/ international dichotomy. As a practice perspective, it  serves to enhance 
inclusivity as well as to make visible relational dynamics and reveal a process dimension to 
the local which incorporates agency but also indigenous customs, cultures and responses to 
conflict which offer constructive entry points for engagement by external peacebuilders. 
Taken together, these additional elements of a Whole-of-Society approach explained in the 
introductory article to this collection of papers, constitute a thicker dialogue between 
interveners and local populations  which can inject new meaning and clarity to the norm of 
local ownership.   
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